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Foreword
This is the seventh1 of our series of reports that focus on pensions issues of direct
relevance to policymakers, financial advisers, and pension scheme members. 
The Conservative–Liberal-Democrat Coalition Government that came to power 
on 11 May 2010 announced that it was going to end the requirement for 
pension scheme members to purchase annuities by the age of 75. 
We felt that would some serious unintended consequences of this proposal and 
wrote to The Times on 27 May 2010:
Sir, The new Government has confirmed manifesto promises to remove the 
requirement that individuals use their pension fund to buy an annuity at retirement. 
Such a policy would be popular, easy to implement and generate much-needed tax 
revenues. However, we have grave concerns that this will have serious consequences 
for the security of pensioners’ retirement incomes and the public finances.
Without an annuity, retired people risk outliving their resources and also bear the 
responsibility of managing their financial assets. If things go wrong, they will surely 
turn to the taxpayer for help. The Conservatives propose a minimum annuity 
purchase, so pensioners never become eligible for means-tested benefits. We suspect 
that estimating such a minimum will be difficult, since benefits are calculated 
according to individual circumstances and these circumstances, together with the level 
of state support, are likely to change considerably over the next 30 years.
The proposal could lead to significant changes in the nation’s savings decisions and 
tax payments. It could also encourage members of occupational pension plans - 
including those in the public sector - to access their entire fund as a lump sum rather 
than receive it as income. This would turn the current steady decline in defined-
benefit pension plans into a rout, as pension fund sponsors - and that would include 
the Government - had to find cash immediately, instead of gradually over a long 
period into the future.
We suggest that the seriousness of the unintended consequences of their pension 
policy is fully recognised and that the policy proposal is re-examined.
Professor David Blake, Director, Pensions Institute, Cass Business School
Dr Edmund Cannon, University of Bristol 
Professor Ian Tonks, University of Exeter
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/letters/article7137165.ece
Following publication of the letter, we were approached by the Prudential and 
invited to prepare a short report that expanded on the ideas that were contained 
in the letter. 
The purpose of ‘Ending compulsory annuitisation: What are the consequences?’ 
is very specific: to stimulate debate about the proposal to end the mandatory 
1. Previous reports are listed at the end of this document.
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requirement to purchase annuities in pension schemes as formally announced in 
the Budget Statement on 22 June 2010. 
This research was sponsored by the Prudential and we are extremely grateful 
for their support. The Prudential has not sought to influence the conclusions 
of the report and they may not share or endorse the views expressed here. 
Furthermore, the Prudential have not imposed any conditions or requirements 
on the contents of the report.
We should also stress that the views in the report are those of the authors 
and not necessarily those of the Pensions Institute, which itself takes no policy 
position.
On 15 July 2010, HM Treasury published a consultation document: ‘Removing 
the requirement to annuitise by age 75’. We intend to respond to this 
consultation document in a more detailed analytical report entitled ‘Ending 
compulsory annuitisation: Quantifying the consequences’ which will be 
published before the consultation period ends on 10 September 2010.
David Blake, Edmund Cannon and Ian Tonks, July 2010
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Executive Summary
1. The Government intends to end the requirement for defined contribution 
personal pension scheme members to annuitise their pension fund by the age of 
75. This report looks at the likely effects and consequences of this policy.
2. Annuities protect individuals against outliving their resources for however 
long they live. Nevertheless, they are also inflexible once purchased and 
consumers tend to avoid buying an annuity if they can do so voluntarily. Three 
reasons have been put forward to explain this: consumers’ low levels of financial 
literacy; consumers’ poor understanding of longevity risk; and behavioural 
biases resulting in consumers making inconsistent or irrational decisions. Yet 
there is evidence to show that the advantages of annuitisation outweigh the 
disadvantages.
3. A number of reasons have been put forward to justify compulsory 
annuitisation: it avoids selection effects; it has lower administrative costs than in 
voluntary annuity markets; it avoids moral hazard problems; it is the quid pro 
quo for tax relief on pension saving; and prevents the pension system being 
used for tax avoidance.
4. If pensioners choose not to buy annuities, they face a range of risks and 
costs associated with running down their retirement savings, including: longevity 
risk, investment return risk; costs of managing pension wealth; and the risk of 
making mistakes. They may mis-manage their pension fund either due to a lack 
of understanding or because of behavioural biases. They might also be sold 
unsuitable investments.
5. There are a number of potential risks to the public purse from removing the 
annuitisation requirement for DC pensions. First, there is the impact on means-
tested state benefits, since pensioners who run out of funds will fall back on 
taxpayers for support. Second, there may be an impact on defined benefit 
pensions. An unintended consequence of allowing DC pensioners to avoid 
annuitisation is that it may encourage DB scheme members, including public 
sector workers in unfunded schemes, to lobby for their pension to be received as 
a lump sum rather than as an income. Third, there are the consequences for tax 
avoidance. Fourth, there are the impacts on government and other long-term 
bond markets.
6. The Government proposes to deal with the impact of ending compulsory 
annuitisation on means-tested benefits by requiring annuitisation up to a 
minimum income requirement (MIR). However, there are a number of problems 
in calculating such a minimum annuity purchase. It is difficult to predict the 
environment in which the means-tested benefits system will operate a long way 
into the future. The state benefits system is complicated and the precise amount 
that needs to be annuitised will depend upon individual circumstances and 
will affect and be affected by means-testing. There is an issue of how to treat 
couples fairly. There is the difficulty in creating appropriate annuity products to 
avoid receipt of means-tested benefits over a lifetime. There is also the difficulty 
in matching pensions to inflation when a number of different definitions of 
inflation (RPI, CPI, LPI and increases in national average earnings) are in use.
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1. Introduction
The Conservative–Liberal-Democrat Coalition Government that came to power 
on 11 May 2010 announced that it intended to end the requirement for defined 
contribution pension scheme members to purchase annuities by the age of 75. 
This was formally confirmed in the Budget Statement of 22 June 2010. The 
Finance Bill 2010 of 1 July announced that the minimum age for annuitisation 
would be raised to 77 years as a transitional measure to defer compulsory 
annuitisation while further consultation on rule changes takes place. On 15 
July 2010, HM Treasury published a consultation document, ‘Removing the 
requirement to annuitise by age 75’, which outlined the government’s proposals. 
The consultation paper emphasises that the tax treatment of pension savings 
should continue to follow the “exempt-exempt-taxed” (EET) model, but suggests 
three important changes: (i) the intention to establish a minimum required 
annuitisation level, based on a minimum income requirement (MIR), (ii) the 
desire to make the annuitisation process more flexible above this amount; and 
(iii) the introduction of a tax relief recovery charge on capital withdrawals to 
recover the value of the tax relief made available during the accumulation phase 
of the pension scheme.
In Section 2, drawing on the arguments in Blake (1999) and Cannon and 
Tonks (2008), we briefly summarise the advantages and disadvantages of 
compulsory annuitisation. In the following two sections, we outline the potential 
consequences of the proposal to abolish the annuitisation requirement, first for 
pensioners themselves (in Section 3) and then for the public sector (in Section 
4). Section 5 looks at the issues surrounding annuitisation up to a MIR, and 
Section 6 concludes. Our intention is to produce a second report with policy 
recommendations, after further analysis and quantification of the issues raised  
in this initial report.
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2 Advantages and disadvantages of compulsory annuitisation 
The most important benefit of annuitisation is that annuities protect individuals 
against outliving their resources. Pensioners who buy an annuity continue to 
receive an income however long they live. As a consequence of this insurance 
against longevity risk, the purchase of an annuity allows each individual to 
maximise the income generated from pension savings. As with all insurance 
products, there is a cross-subsidy from the insureds who do not make a claim 
to the insureds who do; in the case of annuities, this cross-subsidy – known as 
a mortality cross-subsidy or a survival credit – is from those individuals that die 
early to those individuals who live for a long time. Annuities also insure against  
a range of other risks and we consider these risks in more detail below. 
The key disadvantage to purchasing an annuity is that it is a once-and-for-all 
decision which locks a pensioner into an inflexible financial asset (since it is 
impossible to renegotiate the terms of the annuity). Cannon and Tonks (2008) 
review a large body of evidence which suggests that this disadvantage is small 
compared with the advantages of annuitisation.
This leaves a paradox: although purchasing an annuity nearly always increases 
the consumer’s welfare, consumers almost always avoid purchasing annuities in 
situations where they are allowed to do so voluntarily. There are three reasons 
why consumers do not purchase annuities despite it being in their long-term 
interests to do so:
1.  consumers’ low levels of financial literacy and difficulties in valuing 
future income and expenditure streams, resulting in poor decision making 
about financial products generally (evidenced not just in pensions but also in 
mortgages or credit card debt);
2.  consumers’ poor understanding of longevity risk and how annuities work: 
many people do not even know what an annuity is; and
3.  behavioural biases resulting in consumers making inconsistent or irrational 
decisions.
A policy of compulsory annuitisation ensures that consumers benefit from 
longevity risk protection in much the same way that policies against smoking 
and drugs help to promote healthy lifestyles. Obliging consumers to purchase 
annuities is certainly paternalistic, but this may be cheaper and more effective 
than trying to re-educate them. Apart from any paternalistic arguments, 
justifications for compulsory annuitisation are that it:
1. avoids the problems associated with selection effects;
2.  is cheaper to administer, and has lower administrative costs than  
voluntary annuity markets;
3. avoids moral hazard problems
4.  is the quid pro quo for tax relief on pension saving, and ensures that the 
pension system is not used for tax avoidance.
Selection effects arise because annuities will be purchased disproportionately 
by people who believe that they will live for a long time, resulting in life insurers 
having to charge higher prices to cover their costs.2 If this effect is strong 
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enough, it may result in adverse selection where annuity (or, indeed, any 
insurance) markets fail to function properly, since people who believe they have 
shorter life expectancies drop out of the market, with the result that annuity 
prices rise further.3 
In a voluntary market, life insurers would have higher administrative and 
marketing costs, since life insurers will devote more resources to collecting 
information about annuitants (to reduce selection effects), and are likely to 
increase marketing budgets to attract particular types of annuitants. Compulsion 
ensures that everyone participates in the market which not only lowers marketing 
costs, but also allows life insurers to price on the basis of national average life 
expectancy and thus charge lower prices overall.4
Moral hazard arises when individuals try to game the system for their own 
advantage at the expense of someone else. The risk in this case is not to the life 
insurer but to the public purse. Obliging someone to buy an annuity eliminates 
the possibility that they spend their retirement savings too quickly and then fall 
back on the state for welfare support (a form of “double dipping”5). In this sense, 
compulsory annuitisation is a bit like compulsory motor insurance, which reduces 
the external consequences of bad luck. We shall discuss the consequences for 
public welfare provision in section 4.1.
Ever since individual pension arrangements were introduced in the UK 
in 1956, tax relief on pension contributions has been granted during the 
accumulation phase to provide an incentive for people to save for an income in 
retirement. The pension itself is taxed with the government’s aim being broad 
fiscal neutrality over the lifetime of the pension plan. Removing compulsory 
annuitisation provides individuals with an incentive to find ways of avoiding 
paying tax in the decumulation phase of a pension plan.
2. This assumes that consumers have more information about their own life expectancy than the life insurer.  Since life expectancy is 
determined partly genetically (and hence can be inferred from the life length of blood relatives) and partly by lifestyle, this asymmetry  
of information will be significant in practice.  
3. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) have documented some evidence for the existence of selection effects in UK annuity markets.  
However, the market has changed since 2002 with more sophisticated underwriting.
4. The Pensions Commission Second Report (2005, pp.110 –114, and Appendix F) devotes several pages to the issue of costs of  
personal pensions covering both the accumulation and decumulation phase.  It concludes that compulsion is considerably cheaper  
than auto-enrolment and that it is essential to have a scheme which does not involve personal advice.
5. Double-dipping refers to a situation where an individual receives multiple state benefits, when the original intention of these policies 
was that these benefits were substitutes.
Ending compulsory annuitisation 0
3 Consequences for pensioners
Annuities are insurance products which remove several important risks and 
costs for pensioners. Following the removal of the compulsory annuitisation 
requirement, individuals who did not voluntarily purchase annuities, would  
then face the following risks:
1. longevity risk:
2.  the costs of managing pension wealth; 
3.  investment return risk; and
4.  the risk of making mistakes.
Individual pensioners face uncertainty about how long they will live: this is 
known as longevity risk. While it is possible for couples to pool their idiosyncratic 
life-expectancy risks, even couples face considerable uncertainty over their joint 
needs for resources in retirement due to longevity risk. Longevity risk makes it 
very difficult for pensioners to plan how best to consume their assets over their 
remaining lifetimes: consume too little and they reduce their standard of living 
and leave a bequest which may be unintentionally too generous; consume 
too much and they risk running out of resources and living their final years in 
straitened circumstances.6 
Not all pensioners will bear these risks equally. A relatively small proportion 
of pensioners are rich in absolute terms and have sufficient wealth to meet 
all of the “necessities” of life in retirement (such individuals may have wealth 
substantially in excess of the lifetime limit of £1.8 million in their pension fund). 
In this report, we do not address the concerns of such people because they are 
such a small proportion of the population and because they do not raise such 
important issues for annuitisation or the public purse.
Turning to more “typical” pensioners, those who do not annuitise face the 
problem of investment return risk and managing their assets. Annuities involve 
an investment return guarantee as well as a longevity guarantee. Managing 
assets is a time-consuming and expensive business and one advantage of 
an annuity is that the fund management is handled by the life insurer. In a 
comprehensive study of management costs, James (2000) estimated that an 
investor needs to put aside about £1.50 in an actively managed unit trust (or 
life office fund) to obtain the market rate of return of £1. One of the driving 
forces behind the Pensions Commission Second Report (2005, pp.110 –113 and 
Appendix F) was the idea that having compulsory enrolment would allow these 
costs to be reduced. Another concern is that vulnerable old people might be 
pressurised into buying unsuitable (i.e., risky and/or high-charge) investments.
Many pensioners minimise investment risk as well as the costs of managing 
assets by placing their savings in deposit accounts with banks or building 
societies, but these typically yield relatively (and, indeed, absolutely) low rates 
of return. A further problem is that the best interest rates on such accounts 
can often only be achieved by regularly opening new accounts, particularly 
6. It is true that the latter possibility is mitigated by means-tested state benefits, but many pensioners would find that these were low 
relative to the pension that they might obtain from an annuity.  And from the perspective of the public finances, this is just what the 
government should be trying to avoid.
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online accounts. The most elderly pensioners are those least likely to be able to 
manage their funds actively or willing to use e-banking. Currently, many such 
accounts are paying rates of return which are negative after deducting tax and 
allowing for inflation. 
It is true that higher rates of return can be achieved by holding pension wealth in 
equity (or, a half-way house, corporate or government bonds). But this exposes 
pensioners to considerable downside risk. Although there is an equity premium, 
leading to higher long-run average returns for equity investments compared with 
safer assets, this is likely to be insufficient to encourage risk-averse pensioners to 
move away from deposit accounts into assets that might fall in value.
Finally, there is the risk of making mistakes. If a pensioner does not purchase an 
annuity, then they need to manage their pension fund and they may do so badly 
either due to lack of understanding or because of behavioural biases. 
A lack of understanding could be due to poor financial education. The general 
level of financial education in the UK, as almost everywhere else, is very low.7 
This means that many people, pensioners included, do not have the skills to 
make sensible investment decisions. An additional cost arising from the removal 
of the compulsory annuitisation rule may be increased expenditure on financial 
education or advice at retirement choices.8
Behavioural biases cause many people to make short-sighted, inconsistent or 
plainly irrational decisions. An important example of poor decision making 
which seems prevalent in savings decisions is a tendency for individuals to 
procrastinate: while people say that they want to change their behaviour, they 
never actually get around to doing so (i.e., they are subject to inertia).
Recent advances in behavioural psychology have begun to provide potential 
solutions to these problems. For example, one way of dealing with behavioural 
biases such as procrastination and inertia is to use “nudges” to encourage 
people to make decisions that improve their welfare. This is consistent with the 
principle of “libertarian paternalism”, whereby a paternalistic state introduces 
a default which it and its advisers believe is in the best interests of the majority 
of people, but individuals can exercise their libertarian right to opt out of the 
default (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, 2008). This was the principle underlying 
auto-enrolment in NEST (the National Employment Savings Trust). But letting 
the default at retirement be to take the whole pension as a lump sum would 
be inconsistent with the principle, because of the very real risks of sub-optimal 
outcomes. 
7. Atkinson, McKay, Kempson, and Collard (2006).
8. Financial Services Authority (2003) reports that fewer than half of people approaching the point of purchasing an annuity  
really understood how it worked.
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4 Consequences for the public sector
There are four sources of risk to the public purse from removing the annuitisation 
requirement for defined contribution personal pensions: 
1. impact on means-tested state benefits and government finances;
2. impact on defined benefit pensions;
3. consequences for tax avoidance;
4. impact on government and other long-term bond markets. 
 
4.1 The impact on means-tested state benefits and government finances
Removing the compulsory annuitisation requirement may result in some 
pensioners’ incomes being substantially lower at some point in the future for 
a number of reasons that have already been mentioned: individuals may be 
unlucky with their investments, they may make mistakes and under-estimate their 
life expectancy, or they may deliberately run down their savings very quickly. For 
whatever reason, once an individual has lost their capital, they will fall back on 
taxpayers for support. Governments cannot credibly commit to refuse to help 
very elderly individuals who have insufficient resources. Such risks could have 
serious effects on the welfare of substantial numbers of individuals for significant 
periods. And if sufficient people are affected for a long enough period, then 
the risk will ultimately fall back upon the public purse and it will have to change 
policy in response.
In common with most developed countries, the UK’s pension system combines 
both state and private pensions: in addition to this, the social welfare system 
also includes measures to ensure that no individual, regardless of age, has 
an income below a minimally acceptable level. This means that pensioners 
are potentially eligible for a variety of state benefits, and the removal of the 
compulsory annuitisation requirement may affect the degree of eligibility.
The state benefit system is complicated and consists of a variety of types of 
benefit: some are unconditional (or conditional only on being above a certain 
age); some are conditional on other personal circumstances and some are 
conditional on a pensioner’s income, wealth or combination of the two (i.e., 
means-tested benefits). This implies that any changes to the pension being 
received by an individual could result in changes to their entitlements from 
the state. In the most extreme case, an individual might access all of their 
accumulated pension savings, and spend it all on immediate consumption, 
and then become eligible for means-tested benefits (double dipping with a 
vengeance). Removing the compulsory annuitisation requirement would thus 
affect total government expenditure.
Apart from changes in government liabilities through state benefits, removing 
compulsory annuitisation will also affect tax receipts. To some extent, this can be 
neutralised through an appropriate tax relief recovery charge (i.e., exit tax) on 
cash withdrawn from pension funds other than by way of annuitisation. In fact, 
this recovery charge might be a net revenue raiser in the short term. However, 
this will be very unpopular: it should not be assumed that pensioners (who are 
also voters) will perceive revenue-neutral changes in taxation indifferently: the 
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very behavioural biases that affect people’s annuitisation decisions may also 
mean that they object to the taxation of pension fund values more than the 
taxation of the pension income that such funds would have generated. 
There are also issues relating to the timing of taxation receipts. Changing the 
timing of receipts would affect the dynamics of both government borrowing 
and the national debt. In the first instance, this might appear to have a 
beneficial impact: if pensioners chose not to annuitise but instead had to pay a 
compensating recovery charge on their pension fund, then tax receipts would 
be brought forward, thereby improving the UK’s financial position. However, the 
improvement would be more apparent than real, since it would mean lower tax 
receipts in the future and might disguise the need for other policy changes to 
reduce the government’s structural deficit.
The government’s long-term fiscal projections in 2008 (HM Treasury, 2008) 
suggested a need to reduce government spending relative to taxation by 
between 1 and 2 per cent of GDP, perhaps about £20 billion per year. Most of 
these calculations were made before the current recession, but it is unlikely that 
the conclusions would be much affected by the recession.9 Some of the structural 
deficit arises from explicit pension and implicit health-care commitments which 
will fall due only in the 2020s and 2030s and which are not explicitly on the 
public’s balance sheet. Bringing forward tax receipts would make the explicit and 
visible national debt smaller, while increasing the public sector net off-balance 
sheet (and hence less visible) liabilities. In the light of this deficit, it is essential 
that changes in government policy do not exacerbate government spending 
commitments in either the short or long term.
The Budget Statement of 22 June 2010 announced that, from April 2011, the 
Basic State Pension will increase by the higher of price inflation (measured by the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) rather than the Retail Price Index (RPI) as previously 
used), increases in national average earnings, or 2.5 per cent. The Basic 
State Pension (which is not means-tested) interacts with Pension Credit (which 
is means-tested): changes in non-means-tested benefits can have significant 
effects on the amount of total means-tested benefits which are being paid. 
4.2 The impact on defined benefit pensions
The annuitisation requirement most obviously applies to defined contribution 
(DC) schemes. But implicitly it also applies to occupational defined benefit (DB) 
pensioners who effectively receive their pension in annuity form automatically. 
A possible unintended consequence of allowing DC pensioners to avoid 
annuitisation is that it encourages DB scheme members to demand their 
pension as a lump sum rather than as an income. An example of how rules 
like this can expand across different types of pension is the gradual expansion 
throughout the twentieth century of the rule that up to 25 per cent of a pension 
can be taken as a tax-free lump sum (Hannah, 1986), which Nigel Lawson tried 
unsuccessfully to reverse in the administration of the 1980s. There is also the risk 
9. Up-dated revisions in December 2009 (HM Treasury, 2009) revised the long-term projections, suggesting that the situation would be 
worse by about 1.5 per cent of GDP by 2050.  Comparison was made difficult by the omission of any tables of numbers, so the estimate 
of 1.5 per cent is based upon a visual analysis of some rather small graphs.  The Office for Budget Responsibility Pre-budget Forecast 
(June, 2010) appeared to confirm this revision, but provided very little detail, noting that “the OBR has not yet had the opportunity to 
study the Treasury’s long-term projections in any detail”.  All of the projections were sensitive to debatable assumptions about the path of 
welfare payments and immigration.
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that individuals in DB schemes may be inappropriately advised to transfer DB 
pension wealth into DC schemes to access the entire lump-sum rather than the 
25 per cent of DB pension wealth which is currently available.
Since 1988, those who leave pensionable service have been entitled to transfer 
their pension wealth. This effectively allows someone to convert their accrued 
pension promise under a DB scheme into a cash sum under a DC arrangement. 
Under current rules, there has been little point in doing this, since it would 
still be compulsory to annuitise 75 per cent of the pension fund by age 75. 
Given transactions costs and the fact that the pension wealth transferred may 
be calculated at unfavourable actuarial rates for all except those with health 
problems, the benefit to following this strategy has been sufficiently small that 
very few pensioners have taken advantage of this possibility.
Removing the annuitisation requirement could change things dramatically. 
Currently, there is a puzzle as to why individuals in a DB scheme seem content 
to convert their implicit pension fund into a regular pension income, whereas 
some individuals whose savings are in a DC scheme are reluctant to annuitise. 
Behavioural psychology would indicate that the annual reporting of the size 
of the DC pension fund, rather than the amount of pension that the fund will 
generate, plays a role in this puzzle. With annual pension statements in DB 
schemes now showing the cash value of DB pensions (in order for individuals 
to be aware that they are within their lifetime limit), the removal of the need 
to annuitise when combined with the presentation of a cash value for accrued 
benefits may have significant behavioural consequences. Put simply, it may lead 
DB members to a preference for taking the fund over the pension. 
Public sector workers are covered by a variety of occupational pension schemes 
most of which are unfunded or funded but implicitly or explicitly underwritten by 
the government. There is a real possibility that a large number of public service 
workers would also demand their pension as a lump sum transfer value and 
therefore dramatically bring forward payments from the government. Effectively, 
off-balance sheet public pension liabilities would be brought onto the balance 
sheet immediately, since the government would have to issue additional bonds 
to make these pension payments. Although in one sense, this is merely an 
accounting change, it could unsettle financial markets. One reason for this is 
that credit markets are not perfect and changing the pattern of the government’s 
cash flows might affect interest rates and credit ratings. 
A similar problem would also be felt by private sector pension funds which 
would be faced with either borrowing or selling financial assets to make the 
cash payments, putting downward pressure on the market prices of those assets. 
Further, a potentially political problem could arise in the case of individuals 
who had opted for the State Second Pension rather than contracting out: they 
would feel that they were being treated differently if they were eligible only for a 
pension rather than a lump sum.
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4.3 The consequences for tax avoidance
As we have already discussed above, the tax privileges extended to pension 
schemes are designed to encourage people to save for an income in retirement, 
but it is difficult to distinguish pension saving from other forms of saving. This 
means that the current pension system is potentially a tax loophole, as it can be 
used to avoid paying tax. 
The Second Report of the Pensions Commission (2005, p.323) explicitly notes 
that individuals can retain flexibility over their savings by accumulating wealth 
in an ISA and then putting it into a pension scheme just before retirement. The 
maximum contribution into a pension fund in any year is the lower of £215,000 
or 100 per cent of earnings, although the June 2010 Budget Statement (¶ 1.118) 
indicates that this annual limit might be reduced to between £30,000 and 
£45,000.
At the moment, the possibility of taking 25 per cent of pension wealth as a 
lump sum means that some occupational schemes allow members to make 
Additional Voluntary Contributions, all of which can then be taken as a lump 
sum. For most individuals, especially those relying on personal pensions, the 
current annuitisation requirement means that a significant part of any additional 
contributions has to be annuitised. 
Let us consider what would happen were the annuitisation requirement to be 
removed altogether. Significant numbers of people approaching retirement are 
likely to have sufficient non-pension wealth that they could take advantage of the 
high annual allowance.
 
Consider someone earning £50,000 who was approaching retirement with 
entitlement to a 50% of final-salary pension and therefore likely to fulfil any 
MIR. Suppose this person had savings available of £30,820 (which would 
not be implausible). These savings could be paid into a personal pension 
fund and attract relief of £7,705 (assuming tax relief were limited to the basic 
rate), allowing a total of £38,525 to be retained as cash in a tax-favoured 
environment (at the moment only 25 per cent of this, or £9,631, could be taken 
as a lump sum).
 
If significant numbers of pensioners engaged in this behaviour, it would result 
in substantial losses in tax receipts. The current proposals to limit the annual 
allowance to between £30,000 and £45,000 would have limited effect for the 
example just considered.10
10. Current anti-forestalling rules apply to people on much higher incomes.
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4.4 The impact on government and other long-term bond markets
The recent public finance crisis in Europe has led many commentators to reflect 
on the exceptionally long term to maturity of UK government debt relative to that 
in other countries, which means that the UK has considerably more flexibility 
in dealing with its primary deficit. A major driver for the UK Debt Management 
Office’s ability to issue long-dated bonds is the demand by life insurers and 
occupational pension funds for suitable assets to back their pension liabilities. 
This is because, notwithstanding their exposure to longevity risk, pension 
payments are akin to long-term, fixed-income liabilities for the provider, which 
can most appropriately be backed with long-dated government (as well as 
corporate) bonds. 
Between 1985 and 2005, life insurers consistently held about 90 per cent of 
their assets in fixed-income assets (Cannon and Tonks, 2010). Over this period, 
this block of fixed-income assets was gradually switched from government bonds 
to corporate bonds, with total holdings of government bonds falling from 80 
per cent to just over 50 per cent. This main reason for this is to benefit from the 
credit and liquidity premia on generally illiquid corporate bonds in a world of 
low interest rates. 
Apart from the maturity structure of the UK public debt, the UK is also unusual 
among developed countries in having a deep and efficient market in inflation-
linked government bonds. Again this is related to the need of pension providers 
to have assets which generate an income which rises in line with inflation 
but with low risk. While returns on equity generally match or exceed inflation 
over the long run, equities are not a “hedge” for pension liabilities since they 
are highly volatile in the short run. Although this can be partially addressed 
by careful portfolio management by pension funds or life insurers, it cannot 
be completely addressed: the recent problems at BP resulting in the dividend 
payment being suspended have already had major repercussions for UK 
pension funds.11 Because of this risk, most life insurers back the majority of their 
pension liabilities – especially pensions in payment – with bonds.
Those wishing to remove compulsory annuitisation should also be aware of 
the consequences of this for the gilts market. It would be unfortunate if a fall in 
demand for annuities led to the gilts market becoming less efficient.
11. According to the Daily Telegraph (9 June 2010) about one-sixth of pension funds income comes from BP alone. But this includes 
pensions in accrual (the accumulation phase) as well as in payment. 
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/barackobama/7815713/Barack-Obamas-attacks-on-BP-hurting-British-
pensioners.html
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5 The issues surrounding a minimum level of annuitisation
HM Treasury (2010) suggests that the problem of double dipping could be 
overcome by imposing an annuitisation requirement to satisfy a minimum 
income requirement (MIR), where the minimum would be set at a sufficiently 
high level that a pensioner could never fall back upon means-tested benefits.12 
However, with means-tested benefits now linked to earnings rather than prices, 
such a policy could be very difficult to implement in practice.
There are a number of problems in calculating a minimum annuity purchase:
1. predicting the future of pension and welfare policies;
2. calculating the effect of individual circumstances on means-testing;
3. deciding how to treat couples fairly;
4.  the difficulty in creating appropriate annuity products to avoid receipt  
of means-tested benefits over a lifetime;
5.  the difficulty in matching pensions to inflation when two definitions of 
inflation are in use.
Predicting the future is no less difficult when it comes to pensions policy than 
with many other areas of economic forecasting. A typical 65-year old male 
pension scheme member has a life expectancy of 87.8 years and an 8 per cent 
probability of living to 100.13 If we replaced the requirement that a pensioner 
never received means-tested benefits with one not permitting pensioners to 
receive means-tested benefits until they became a centenarian, we would 
still need to forecast the evolution of the entire benefit system for thirty five 
years. Casting our minds back to 1975, we believe that no one then could 
have predicted what would happen to the UK pension and welfare system 
in the period 1976–2010 and we believe that there may be similar problems 
in predicting the period 2011– 2046. So any minimum annuity purchase 
requirement which is appropriate for conditions today is very unlikely to be 
appropriate for the whole of the pensioner’s lifetime. If pensions or welfare 
policy changes,14 then there will need to be procedures to determine who bears 
the consequences: will the pensioner be made worse off or will the taxpayer 
bear the burden?
One possible way to deal with this uncertainty would be to set a series of rules 
based on what is considered “likely” to happen in the future. Aside from any 
disagreement about what is “likely”, this creates a trade-off between setting 
a high minimum and a low minimum. A low minimum annuity requirement 
entails a high probability that a pensioner will become eligible for means-
tested benefits as a result of future policy changes. A high minimum annuity 
requirement reduces the number of people who benefit from the policy change, 
possibly restricting the scope of the new policy to the very wealthy.
12. According to the Pension Commission (2005, p. 33): “The Government should consider where there is a case for a cash limit to the 
amount which individuals are required to annuitise at any age (with the benefits of tax relief recovered via the appropriate tax treatment 
of withdrawals during life or of balances remaining at time of death)”. In HM Treasury (2006), the last government rejected this proposal 
(paragraph 3.27, p. 19).
13. Derived from the mortality table PNMA00 projected to 2010 with a 1% improvement floor.
14. There are a variety of possible changes: the level of pensions or other benefits could change; some benefits could start or cease  
to be means-tested;  the rules for how the different benefits interact could also change. Over such a long period it is quite possible that 
some of the changes that will occur are currently inconceivable.
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A second problem is that the existing state benefits system is complicated and 
the precise amount that needs to be annuitised will depend upon individual 
circumstances. This means that it will be difficult to calculate the minimum 
annuity requirement by just assuming the existing set of rules with no allowance 
for any changes. The minimum is likely to vary according to where one lives, 
leading to complaints of a “post-code lottery”, especially since some life insurers 
are also using personal data, such as address, to determine annuity prices.
For an individual pensioner in good health owning a house with a full set of 
National Insurance contributions, the calculations would be straightforward, 
because the only means-tested benefit that they would receive would be Pension 
Credit (which tops up the Basic State Pension to ensure a guaranteed level of 
income). This individual would receive the maximum Basic State Pension of 
£97.65 per week (£5,077.80 per year). The minimum income guaranteed by 
Pension Credit is £6,895.20, so an individual with the maximum Basic State 
Pension would have to annuitise sufficient wealth to receive an income of 
£1,817.40. Assuming an annuity rate of just over 6 per cent, this would mean an 
annuity purchase of about £30,000 for a 65-year old male today. An annuity 
linked to increases in the Retail Prices Index would cost around £45,000.
In practice, for most people the calculation would be much more complicated 
for a variety of reasons, including the impact of any National Insurance shortfall 
on their level of Basic State Pension or the existence of other pensions or savings 
affecting the level of Pension Credit. This problem is particularly acute for 
women.15 In addition, some pensioners will have made contributions to previous 
additional public pension schemes, SERPS or S2P,16 which will make calculation 
of their full state pension more complicated.  
The situation would be even more complicated for someone who had to rent 
accommodation because they could well be entitled to Housing Benefit, which 
is a means-tested benefit (dependent both on income and financial wealth),17 
which varies by region (because rents differ regionally). Since pensioners might 
move after retirement, this raises the question of what would happen if they 
subsequently moved to a region where rents were higher.18 
Pensioners who are unable to look after themselves also receive Attendance 
Allowance. This is not means-tested, but it does increase the maximum income 
that one can receive before becoming ineligible to receive Housing Benefit and 
Pension Credit and thus the likelihood that a currently healthy pensioner would 
receive Attendance Allowance in the future would presumably raise the minimum 
purchased at retirement.
In a very small number of cases, pensioners might be receiving means-
15. Full time parents and carers can receive NI contributions, but these have to be claimed for and not everyone claims their  
full entitlement.
16. The State-Earnings Related Pensions Scheme (SERPs) was replaced by the State Second Pension (S2P) in 2002. Membership of these 
pension schemes was compulsory for people in work who did not “opt out” into an occupational scheme.  In practice, many pensioners 
will have pensions from a variety of sources
17. The Budget Statement of 22 June announced that there will be a maximum limit on the amount of Housing Benefit that a family  
will receive, although there were no details on how this would interact with additional local government support (which is discretionary).
18. We are not sure how many pensioners are likely to fall into this situation: obviously it would only apply to people poor enough  
not to own a house but rich enough to have some form of personal pension that was sufficiently high not to fall under the trivial 
commutation requirement.
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tested benefits for caring for a disabled person (Carer’s Allowance) or a child 
(Child Tax Credit). In the case of Carer’s Allowance, a pensioner who was not 
entitled to the allowance would still receive the Carer’s Premium in calculating 
entitlement to Housing Benefit.19 
The third issue is that most annuities, even if purchased by an individual, will 
need to provide an income for a couple (or possibly a family with other long-
term dependants, such as a disabled relative). It is possible that both members 
of a couple will have their own pension arrangements which will independently 
remove the possibility of them receiving means-tested benefits. But in many 
cases, one partner, typically the female partner, may have made insufficient 
National Insurance contributions to receive a state pension in her own right and 
the couple will receive a state pension as a couple which is more than would 
be received by an individual. The Basic State Pension (assuming a full set of NI 
contributions) is £5,077.80 per year for an individual but £8,119.80 for a couple, 
with corresponding Pension Credit guaranteeing incomes of £6,895.20 and 
£10,524.80, respectively. Currently, the husband could purchase a single life 
annuity: if, as is likely, he dies first, then the wife might fall back upon means-
tested benefits anyway. This suggests that the proposals in HM Treasury (2010) 
would actually strengthen the annuitisation requirement slightly depending on 
whether the requirement to avoid means-testing would apply to the individual or 
the household.
To meet the MIR over a pensioner’s lifetime, annuity providers would need to 
offer different sorts of annuity products from those currently provided, since the 
conditions for receiving means-tested benefits will change, leading to another 
problem: the difficulty in creating appropriate annuity products to avoid receipt 
of means-tested benefits over a lifetime. Since the Basic State Pension from April 
2011 will increase in line with national average earnings, the MIR will need to 
grow in line with national average earnings, and hence the required annuity 
purchased will need to be indexed to the growth in earnings. 
Such annuity products are not available at present, and it is unclear whether 
annuity providers would be able to offer them, since there is no obvious 
matching asset for annuity providers to invest in. Currently, final salary 
occupational pension schemes face a similar problem and hedge against wage 
growth during the accumulation phase of their scheme in two ways: by investing 
in risky equities (which tends to be correlated with wage growth in the long 
term), and through cross-subsidies between age-cohorts. If annuity providers 
were to begin offering wage-indexed annuities, they would also probably have 
to invest in equities (which would increase their capital requirements under 
Solvency II) and they would be unable to cross-subsidise different age-cohorts 
(unless the annuities were of the with-profit type). Alternatively, the government 
might consider issuing long-term bonds with a coupon linked to wage-growth, 
which could then be bought by annuity providers as matching assets for their 
wage-indexed annuities. However, the UK Debt Management Office has shown 
considerable reluctance to innovate in the design of bonds that it issues, as 
evidenced by its refusal to issue longevity bonds which would help pension 
schemes and annuity providers hedge the aggregate longevity risk they face 
(United Kingdom Debt Management Office, 2009, p30). 
19. However, a preliminary look at the data suggests that the sums of money involved in Carer’s Allowance paid to the over-65s are tiny 
(about £6 million per year in total).
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An additional problem arises purely from the treatment of inflation, because 
there are currently three different measures of inflation in use in the UK pension 
industry: the Retail Price Index (RPI); the Consumer Price Index (CPI); and Limited 
Price Indexation (LPI). The difference between the RPI and the CPI arises from the 
fact that they measure the prices of different goods and use different methods 
for averaging price changes. The LPI follows the RPI but is capped at 2.5 per 
cent. This will only be sufficient to protect pensioners if the Bank of England is 
consistently successful in hitting the inflation target of 2 per cent: if inflation is 
regularly higher then pensioners are not fully protected against inflation.
Existing pensions and benefits are typically linked to the RPI, but the government 
has announced that state pensions and public pensions will be linked to the CPI 
(which tends to be slightly lower than the RPI).  On 8 July 2010, the Minister of 
State for Work and Pensions, Steve Webb MP, announced that the government 
would also introduce legislation so that defined benefit pensions could also be 
linked to the CPI instead of the RPI (although it is not clear how this will apply to 
all private pensions, since some are explicitly linked to the RPI in the trust deeds 
and changing to the CPI would require a more substantial piece of legislation).20 
Inflation-linked government bonds are tied to the RPI, suggesting a particular 
problem: the difficulty in matching pensions to inflation when two definitions of 
inflation are in use.
Regardless of whether the inflation indexing is RPI, CPI or LPI, indexing pensions 
to prices does not ensure that pensions rise in line with earnings and hence 
the value of a private pension will fall relative to state pensions and the MIR, 
suggesting the possibility that a pensioner whose pension is rising in line with 
one of the inflation indices will eventually be eligible for means-tested pension 
benefits. Moving from the RPI to the CPI will exacerbate this problem: the CPI 
and LPI are usually lower than the RPI and are expected to remain so into the 
medium term (the Budget Statement of 22 June explicitly mentioned that using 
the CPI to upgrade welfare benefits would save money).
Finally, we reiterate the point that government policy is itself partly endogenous 
because it is influenced by attitudes of the general public, of whom the retired 
population form a large part. There seems to be a psychological bias that 
retired people are unwilling to use their pension capital to finance retirement 
(Poterba, 1994). Any relaxation of the annuitisation requirement will thus result 
in pensioners consuming only from income rather than capital and thus having 
a lower standard of living. If such expectations become embedded in public 
debate then a likely corollary is that there will be more pressure to augment 
pensioners’ income through state pensions or benefits, thus placing even more 
pressure on the public purse.
19.  http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmhansrd/cm100708/wmstext/100708m0001.htm
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6 Conclusions
We have attempted to identify some of the issues and consequences of the 
government’s decision to end compulsory annuitisation. These consequences fall 
into two categories, those that affect individuals and those that affect the wider 
society in terms of claims on the public purse. 
If individuals, as a consequence of low levels of financial literacy, poor 
understanding of longevity risk, poor investment decisions or a deliberate 
strategy, run down their retirement assets too quickly, then their welfare in 
retirement will be much reduced. They will also become entitled to means-tested 
benefits.
The consequences for taxpayers could be equally devastating. Not only could 
there be a huge increase in claims for means-tested benefits. There could also 
be demand from defined benefit scheme members, including public sector 
workers in unfunded schemes, to have their pension as a lump sum rather than 
as an income. There will also be new opportunities to use the pension system 
to create tax loopholes and there is likely to be a fall in the demand for long-
term government bonds which will occur at precisely the time the government is 
issuing debt to plug the hole in the government finances.
To mitigate these problems, the government is proposing a minimum 
annuitisation requirement to satisfy a minimum income requirement, such that 
the minimum would be set at a sufficiently high level that pensioners could never 
fall back upon means-tested benefits. While this goes some way to dealing 
with the consequences we have highlighted, we also pointed out a number of 
problems with determining what the minimum level should be, chief among 
these being the wide differences in individual circumstances and the difficulty 
in creating appropriate annuity products that are guaranteed to avoid the 
need to claim means-tested benefits ever again. These are factors that must be 
confronted if the government’s proposal is to succeed.
This initial report has outlined some of the issues and consequences of removing 
the UK’s compulsory annuitisation requirement at age 75. Our intention is to 
write a follow-up report in which we will further analyse the impacts of removing 
the annuitisation requirement. In the second report, we will provide quantitative 
assessments of the following: (i) the size of the minimum income requirement 
and the feasibility of annuities which are index-linked or have a wage-growth 
linkage; (ii) the likely effects of the MIR on the range of pensioners who will be 
affected by the proposal; (iii) the impact of the proposal on DB schemes and 
long-term government bond markets; and (iv) the cognitive problems that elderly 
people can face when dealing with investments. We will also provide policy 
recommendations in relation to this proposal.
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Appendix
Summary of HM Treasury’s consultation document ‘Removing the 
requirement to annuitise by age 75’ published on 15 July 2010 
•  The consultation recognises that for many an annuity will always remain the 
best product
•  However the Government wishes to introduce greater flexibility in how 
people can take income to reflect the changing pensions and workplace 
environment, to encourage more pension saving and to encourage product 
innovation. 
•  The age 75 rules on annuitisation, value protection lump sums, tax free cash 
and trivial commutation lump sums will be removed.
• The age 75 rules on contributions and Lifetime Allowance checks will remain.
•  Pension funds will be able to remain in a USP (“capped drawdown”) 
indefinitely. ASPs will cease to exist.
•  The USP maximum withdrawal limit may be reviewed. The current 120% is 
probably too high at older ages and may have to be less than 100% to avoid 
the risk of people exhausting their funds.
• There will be no minimum withdrawal requirement.
• Any withdrawals will be taxed as income.
•  A USP customer will be able to access additional flexibility (in effect 
the permanent removal of the upper withdrawal limit) through “flexible 
drawdown” provided they have secured a minimum income (the Minimum 
Income Requirement). This minimum income will need to be a secure pension 
income for life and escalate by the lower of 2.5% or inflation.
•  The customer would then be able to withdraw up to 100% of the remainder 
of their fund. This will be taxed as income.
• The minimum income required is not set out in the consultation paper.
•  However they expect it to take account of not just current means-tested 
benefits, but also potential health costs and future expenditure needs.
• Restrictions on value-protection annuities will be removed.
•  Lump sum death benefits will be taxed at 55% to counteract tax relief given 
- this includes value-protection payments.
•  The only exception is pension saving where no part has been used for an 
income when the saver dies before 75 where the pot will be tax free.
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The consultation asks for responses on 10 questions:
A.1 The level of an appropriate annual drawdown limit for capped drawdown. 
A.2  Its intended approach to reforming the pensions tax framework, in line 
with its commitment to end the effective requirement to purchase an 
annuity at age 75. 
A.3  What income should be considered ‘secure’ for the purposes of the MIR 
and whether proposals for the life annuity income that can be considered 
for the MIR are practical and appropriate. 
A.4  What an appropriate level for the MIR should be and how the MIR should 
be adjusted for different ages. 
A.5 Whether a different MIR should be set for individuals and couples. 
A.6 How often the MIR level should be reviewed. 
A.7  How to minimise unnecessary burdens for individuals and industry in the 
assessment of the MIR. 
A.8  Whether other legislative or regulatory barriers remain whose removal 
would enable industry to provide consumers with more attractive products 
without incurring fiscal or avoidance risks. 
A.9  How the industry, Government and advice bodies such as CFEB can work 
to ensure that individuals make appropriate choices about what to do with 
their retirement savings in the absence of the requirement to purchase an 
annuity by age 75. 
A.10  Whether the proposed reforms have unintended consequences that may 
affect the market’s ability to supply annuities at attractive rates or prevent 
the annuity market being able to meet likely demand for annuities.
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Statement by Prudential UK & Europe
Prudential is pleased to sponsor this report examining the potential impact of the 
removal of the ‘age 75’ annuitisation rule.
Established in 1848, Prudential remains one of the country’s best known 
financial institutions, and one of the UK’s leading providers of retirement 
income. 
Society faces many challenges as patterns of employment, private pension 
provision and needs in retirement change. We believe it is right that pension 
rules are reviewed and updated to reflect such changing circumstances and we 
welcome the opportunity to contribute to the debate about the direction of those 
reforms. 
Whatever reforms are considered, the most important objective of the retirement 
income market remains to provide consumers with a replacement income by the 
most efficient and appropriate means. 
In practice, we believe that for most people the “income for life” guarantee 
under an annuity will continue to provide the cornerstone of retirement income. 
As this report demonstrates, it is important for everyone that this core message is 
not lost. 
It is also critically important that changes are made only after the potential 
consequences for consumers and the public finances are understood and,  
where necessary, addressed. 
We believe this report provides an important insight into the risks and 
consequences for individual consumers and for society that need to be taken 
into account when considering reform of the current rules.
 
Prudential looks forward to supporting the publication of the second research 
report. By quantifying the potential impact of rule changes we believe the second 
report will provide valuable information to policymakers when considering 
proposals for reform.
Prudential UK & Europe
July 2010
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About the Pensions Institute
The objectives of the Pensions Institute (www.pensions-institute.org) are to 
undertake high quality research in all fields related to pensions, to communicate 
the results of that research to the academic and practitioner community, to 
establish an international network of pensions researchers from a variety of 
disciplines, and to provide expert independent advice to the pensions industry 
and government.
We take a fully multidisciplinary approach. For the first time disciplines such as 
economics, finance, insurance, and actuarial science through to accounting, 
corporate governance, law and regulation have been brought together in order 
to enhance strategic thinking, research and teaching in pensions.
As the first and only UK academic research centre focused entirely on pensions, 
the Pensions Institute unites some of the world’s leading experts in these fields in 
order to offer an integrated approach to the complex problems that arise in this field.
Objectives
The Pensions Institute undertakes research in a wide range of fields, including:
Pension Microeconomics
The economics of individual and corporate pension planning, long-term savings 
and retirement decisions.
Pension Fund Management and Performance
The investment management and investment performance of occupational and 
personal pension schemes.
Pension Funding and Valuations
The actuarial and insurance issues related to pension schemes, including risk 
management, asset-liability management, funding, scheme design, annuities, 
and guarantees.
Pension Law and Regulation
The legal aspects of pension schemes and pension fund management.
Pension Accounting, Taxation and Administration
The operational aspects of running pension schemes.
Marketing
The practice and ethics of selling group and individual pension products.
Macroeconomics of Pensions
The implications of aggregate pension savings and the impact of the size and 
maturity of pension funds on other sectors of the economy (e.g., corporate, 
public and international sectors).
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Public Policy
Domestic and EU social policy towards pension provision and other employee 
benefits in the light of factors such as the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty 
and the demographic developments in Europe and other countries.
Research disseminated by the Pensions Institute may include views on policy but 
the Pensions Institute itself takes no institutional policy positions.
